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Immigration is one of the key issues of contestation in contemporary European 
politics (Boswell, 2003). The populist radical right has mobilised around it, some 
parts of the media are similarly obsessed with it, and many voters feel just as strongly 
about it. Yet the extent to which immigration plays a part in electoral competition in 
individual states varies considerably, especially when it comes to the use made of the 
issue by those parties generally considered mainstream rather than extreme. In some 
countries, the centre-right and the centre-left have made immigration central to their 
electoral campaigns. In others, the issue registers temporarily on their electoral radar 
screen, only to drop off it at subsequent elections (see e.g. Green-Pedersen and 
Krogstrup, 2008; Pellikann et al, 2007; Cornelius et al, 1994; Thränhardt, 1995).  
This variance constitutes a puzzle for the study of electoral politics. Studies 
that try to explain it sometimes start with the supply side, namely the electoral 
significance of anti-immigration parties (see e.g. Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Betz, 
1994, Mudde, 2004). The mainstream, the argument runs, shies away from 
immigration, effectively creating a vacuum that the radical right rushes in to fill. 
Immigration becomes an ‘issue’ as anti-immigration parties are able to capitalise on 
those voters whose concerns about immigration are supposedly ignored by the parties 
they traditionally support, leaving them with little alternative but the extremist or 
radical option.  In order to remedy this electoral ‘theft’, mainstream parties react by 
sharpening their own stances, breaking taboos, and doing deals, either to exclude the 
radical right from government or to give it a share of the spoils of office, possibly as a 
full-blown coalition partner or else as some kind of support party.  None of this, 
however, can satisfactorily explain why immigration is picked up, and picked over, in 
countries where the electoral and/or parliamentary presence of the radical right is, if 
not absent, then far too small to present a serious threat – an important reminder that 
mainstream parties (and not necessarily only those on the right) do not always need 
prompting by ‘niche’ competitors in order to talk about or act upon the issue, often in 
pretty populist terms (Alonso and da Fonseca, 2012; see also Bale, 2013 and 
Carvalho, 2014). 
Conversely, a focus on the demand side - on voters - faces problems too. 
Simply knowing what the electorate thinks about immigration does not allow us to 
fully account for either the positions that parties adopt or for when the issue is (or is 
not) emphasised by parties during electoral campaigns. Whatever spatial theory 
(Downs, 1957) suggests, party positions on immigration are often uncoordinated with 
the electorate’s views, not least because there is no guarantee of congruence between 
elite and public priorities and because, owing perhaps to ‘issue diversity’ (Hobolt et 
al, 2008) and ‘agenda friction’ (Schattschneider, 1960), parties can be slow to respond 
to voter preferences – especially when the electoral situation they face does not 
appear to be unduly critical (Adams et al, 2004; Budge, 1994). In any case, in an era 
of valence (as opposed to position) politics, voters' ideological preferences may 
matter less than their judgements about the ability of parties to deliver competently 
(see e.g. Stokes, 1963; Riker, 1996; Green, 2007). In the immigration context, this 
may well come down to their ability to limit the numbers coming into the country – 
something that may not be wholly within the control of even the most resolute 
government: as a recent study of a country whose governments frequently find it 
difficult to live up to their promises to voters on this score notes, ‘restrictive reform is 
constrained by international and European law, global economic trends and organised 
interests’ (Ford et al., 2014).  
The immigration ‘issue’ is of course ideologically loaded, but it can 
nonetheless be understood as a valance question since mainstream parties, with some 
exceptions, now seem to agree on the direction that policy should take, namely to 
achieve both control and cultural and economic integration.  That said, a party that 
‘owns’ immigration (Odmalm, 2014; 2012; 2011, van der Brug, 2004; Petrocik, 1996) 
is thus likely to emphasise the issue whereas a party that does not and/or performs 
relatively worse will downplay or ignore it. Green and Hobolt (2008) identify a link 
between issue ownership and how parties strive to raise the salience level of that 
particular issue. However, these efforts primarily tend to pay off when they also 
coincide with voters’ own perceptions of the importance of the issue, which are never 
simply a function of party mobilisation (Belanger and Meguid, 2008). This raises the 
possibility of a mismatch between party approaches and the electorate’s responses or 
priorities. Why, then, do parties get this calculation ‘wrong’?   
For one thing, political parties operate within a space that has at least two-
dimensional dimensions (Kriesi et al, 2006; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). On the 
one hand, there is a Left-Right axis referring to the appropriate level of state 
involvement in the economy. As such, parties are classified along a spectrum ranging 
from ‘socialist’ to ‘neo-liberal’ (Evans at al, 1996; Kriesi et al, 2006). This ‘old’ 
politics dimension concerned, among other issues, labour market regulation, 
public/private ownership and level of taxation, and characterised a majority of the 
West European democracies from the mid-20th century to the early 1970s. Divisions 
between parties were often sharp with voter preferences mapping onto social class. 
From the 1970s onwards, however, conflict regarding the state’s involvement in the 
economy became less polarised and contestation, when present, tended to revolve 
around, say, the scope of publicly provided welfare or the speed of privatisation 
However, a ‘new’ source of conflict emerged which related to ‘post-material’ 
(Inglehart, 1997), or what Hooghe et al (2002) have labelled, GAL/TAN issues 
(Green/Alternative/Libertarian - Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist), and which 
concerned e.g. environmental protection, nationalism, personal freedoms, and 
questions of ethnicity and culture.  
As Hooghe et al. also note, attitudes towards further EU integration constitute 
a particularly difficult issue for parties to assimilate into either an economic or a 
socio-cultural (GAL/TAN) Left-Right dimension. Immigration gives rise to a similar 
dilemma since it cuts across several, sometimes disparate, policy fields. It not only 
has economic effects, whether ‘positive’ (e.g. meeting supply shortages or keeping 
wage inflation low) or ‘negative’ (e.g. sparking labour market chauvinism, creating a 
new, ‘ethnic’ underclass or removing the incentives for firms and governments to 
train and educate the native-born working class), but also impacts on notions of 
national identity, social cohesion, language, welfare provision, law and order, 
terrorism and security, and cultural practices. This puts the political mainstream in a 
continual quandary since these effects tap into prevailing ideological tensions that 
exist within, and between, parties. The shift from uni- to multi-dimensional 
contestation not only adds further complexity to party classification (Benoit and 
Laver, 2007; Klingemann et al, 2006), but, rather more importantly, also means that 
these tensions can crystallise thus subjecting parties to a set of conflicting ideological 
‘pulls’ (Odmalm, 2011; 2014) on a whole series of issues.  Most obviously, the right’s 
traditional emphasis on ‘less state’ in the economy is counterpointed by a pull 
towards ‘more state’ influence on individual lifestyle choices and the preservation of 
national identity, while the left’s traditional concern to limit the role of the market, 
through extensive state action, provides a contrast with ideas of localised democracy, 
international solidarity and increased personal freedom that arguably call for less state 
influence. The introduction of a new, and increasingly non-economic, cleavage 
allowed new parties to form and be (occasionally) successful – in particular Green 
parties - and, as such, these ideological tensions have often been neutralised (Jahn, 
1993; Müller-Rommel, 1989).   
However, competing on the immigration ‘issue’ can trigger the (re)emergence 
of these strains, prompting dilemmas of framing, positioning and campaigning for the 
political mainstream. For the centre-right, immigration crystallises a tension between 
market liberal and culturally conservative wings (see the various contributions to 
Bale, 2008). The former, predominantly present in liberal and conservative parties, 
often pushes for immigration policies to be liberalised and for the private sector to 
have greater powers in deciding the appropriate levels of, especially, labour migration 
(see Spehar et al., 2013). The latter, often present in Christian Democratic and 
conservative parties, will be hesitant about handing over such a key area of 
sovereignty to non-state actors, fearing the loss of control of national borders and 
culture. Both wings also tend to experience conflicting attitudes towards asylum and 
family reunification migration. Since the former category is usually legally prevented 
from economic participation, and the latter’s entry into the labour market can be 
delayed due to linguistic, cultural and/or educational reasons, it will make the benefits 
of these types of migrants less obvious which in turn will make it difficult for market 
liberals to justify why policies should be liberalised. While asylum migration, and 
subsequent family reunification, may also bring individuals who emphasise the 
family unit and traditional lifestyles, their perceptions of the ‘family’ and ‘traditional 
lifestyles’ may run contrary to what the culturally conservative wing has in mind. 
Further problems may arise if these ‘new’ values and lifestyles clash with particular 
‘Western’ values that stress e.g. equality, especially between the sexes, or 
emancipation.   
Immigration poses just as many dilemmas for the centre-left (see Bale et al., 
2010 and 2012). For Social Democratic and reformed Left parties, limiting it can 
easily be seen as vital in order to retain collective power and good terms and 
conditions in the labour market (see Hinnfors et al. 2011). Giving up the right to 
decide on entry would run the risk of undermining the collectively bargained 
agreements and allow wages to be undercut. And in the long run, ‘uncontrolled’ 
immigration could potentially create not new recruits to the cause (Ireland, 2004; 
Breunig and Luedtke, 2008, see also Messina, 2007) but rather a new – ethnic - 
underclass and accordingly, split the indigenous working class (Givens and Luedtke, 
2004). At the same time, the centre-left has been influenced by ‘new’ post-material 
ideas. Green and reformed Left parties often view immigration as a fundamental 
human right and taking on workers and, especially, refugees would thus be an 
important aspect of showing one’s credentials of international solidarity (Jahn, 1993; 
Müller-Rommel, 1989).  
These tensions will have an affect on party behaviour and competition. 
Adopting a position that links immigration with international solidarity or the free 
market, or with labour market protectionism or value-conservatism is associated with 
particular risks and emphasising either position will have important electoral and 
organisational implications. If parties get the emphasis wrong, it may alienate their 
natural voters and jeopardise governing potential. As such, the immigration ‘issue’ 
can cause ideological splits and intra-party fragmentation, which further hinders the 
chances of winning elections. Little wonder, then, that it often makes strategic sense 
to downplay or ignore immigration as an electoral priority. Yet parties have to be 
sensitive to shifts in public opinion and if immigration moves up the agenda, they 
must respond to voters’ concerns. On the other hand, emphasising the issue too much 
gives the populist radical right unwanted attention and may further destabilise the 
political arena. Parties must therefore perform a difficult balancing act. They must 
engage with the immigration ‘issue’ in a way that avoids highlighting these tensions, 
thereby shifting the electoral focus away from parties’ key areas of policy strength 
and electoral priorities. At the same time, they have somehow to improve their 
capacity to handle a matter of acute public concern while not opening themselves up 
to criticism, which, in turn, gives the populist radical right unwarranted attention.  
In the light of all this, we ask the contributors to this special issue to address 
when, why, and how do mainstream parties decide whether or not to emphasise 
immigration during their election campaigns? Of particular concern has been to 
evaluate the explanatory potential of two competing frameworks. 
On the one hand, there is a more structurally orientated approach which 
addresses the extent to which parties react to a set of immigration ‘shocks’, and then 
assesses the importance of these for the type of party responses, (re)positioning and 
electoral strategies pursued (Norris, 1995; van Spanje, 2010; Mudde, 2004, see also 
Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Betz, 1994). These 
shocks are not just limited to the emergence, and subsequent electoral success, of the 
populist radical right but are also contingent upon an additional set of indigenous and 
exogenous factors. These include, but are not limited to the following: increased 
immigration and asylum pressures; the perceived economic and/or cultural ‘cost’ of 
immigration/integration and changing levels of media and public attention paid to the 
immigration ‘issue’. None of these factors exist independently of each other and more 
often than not they will create a feedback loop in the political discourse. But 
immigration will impact on countries in different ways and responses have 
subsequently tended to vary. Parties therefore tend to behave selectively and may 
emphasise particular aspect(s) of the immigration ‘issue’ in their campaigns. 
Additionally, certain events, such as increased terrorist activities or threats, often 
manage to cut across the immigration/integration divide. It would thus seem 
reasonable to assume that the above factors lead parties to respond by sharpening 
their stances on the immigration ‘issue’. That is, one might anticipate finding a degree 
of fit between immigration developing in a ‘negative’ direction and parties taking up 
more restrictive positions and discourses.  
 There is, however, a second approach. The first assumes that there is a stimulus-
response relationship between immigration ‘shocks’ and restrictive repositioning.  This 
does not attribute parties much agency or agenda-setting power. It also leaves us 
wondering how it is, if parties’ responses to the presence of populist radical right 
challengers or various immigration and integration pressures really are so automatic,    
they often ‘fail’ to campaign on, or emphasise, a restrictive agenda.   
 The special issue, then, will also consider how much agency parties exercise 
and how much leeway they actually have or give themselves (van der Brug, 2004; 
Petrocik, 1996). While migratory pressures and populist radical right challenges are 
obviously still relevant in explaining party actions, contributors also consider parties’ 
ability to handle the conflicting ideological strains described above. Since immigration 
has been described as being an important contributor to the transformation of established 
cleavages (Kriesi et al, 2006; 2008) as well as an issue associated with the demise of 
ideology (Lahav, 1997), parties are likely to find it difficult to come up with a new 
‘master frame’ (Rydgren, 2005) around the issue while simultaneously experiencing 
intra-organisational strains due to competing factions and issue orientations. If they 
cannot successfully negotiate, and manage, these opposing ‘pulls’, parties might therefore  
try to divert attention to issues on which they are particularly trusted . This focus will 
thus allow us to examine and explain instances where parties do not behave as expected. 
Based on these conditions and what the literature suggests about party 
behaviour, we propose the following three hypotheses:  
 
H1: Mainstream parties will emphasise their ability to deal with the immigration 
‘issue’ if there is significant inter-party agreement over the direction of 
immigration/integration policies.  Where there is no such agreement, they will not do 
so.  
 
H2: Mainstream parties will downplay/ignore the immigration ‘issue’ if voters’ trust 
in them on the issue is lower than it is for the other party/other parties. 
 
H3: Mainstream parties will divert attention toward areas of greater competence if 
they are unable to resolve any ideological tensions stemming from the immigration 
‘issue’. 
 
 
Case selection 
 
Some of the cases included in this special issue (namely, Belgium; Germany; the 
Netherlands and Sweden) would feature in any line of ‘the usual suspects’ when it 
comes to studying the politics of immigration in Western Europe.  However, we have 
also included cases that are covered less frequently (namely, Italy, Greece and Spain). 
All our countries not only have a sizable migrant and/or ethnic minority population 
but they have also, with the partial exception of the latter three, received substantial 
attention in the literature (see e.g. Boswell, 2006; Castles and Miller. 2003; Hammar, 
2006; Messina, 2007). The cases are of further interest since they also offer a high 
degree of variation in terms of the sources of newcomers, approaches to integration, 
and the degree of contestation that the immigration ‘issue’ endures during elections.  
Belgium and the Netherlands form a ‘post-colonial’ pairing which is 
juxtaposed by Sweden, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain which, conversely, have 
had higher numbers of asylum seekers and, especially for the latter three, 
undocumented migrants. Similarly, the countries differ in terms of their conceptions 
of citizenship (Bauböck et al, 2006) and in their approaches to migrant integration 
(Koopmans et al 2006; Koopmans and Statham, 2000). Finally, the way that the 
immigration ‘issue’ has appeared on parties’ electoral radar screens shows ample 
variation but also some crucial similarities. While the Dutch parties have come to 
adopt an increasingly confrontational approach, immigration has rarely been a source 
of contestation in Sweden, even though both countries share similar institutional 
surroundings and (traditionally anyway) similar approaches to integration. On the 
other hand, Germany and Sweden display some surprising similarities in the way that 
the immigration ‘issue’ has played out in electoral politics even though these cases 
have very different institutional conditions and ways of dealing with immigration and 
integration. Some of the cases have also experienced the sudden rise of populist 
radical right challengers but this rise has prompted markedly different mainstream 
party responses. Although some of the Swedish parties have hinted at a more 
restrictive line on immigration, they have not abandoned key stances on asylum, anti-
discrimination and cultural differences which, in contrast, have been modified and in 
some cases completely abandoned in the Netherlands. In addition, the Swedish parties 
have showed few signs of trying to accommodate the populist radical right or 
incorporating its issue positions. 
Italy and Belgium are, in comparison, the odd cases out. In the former, there 
are difficulties involved in identifying ‘the mainstream’, especially if the mainstream 
parties are defined according to ideological distance and electoral success. Such a 
definition would place the populist radical right very much at the heart of the Italian 
centre-right family thus blurring the distinction between ‘mainstream’ and 
‘radical’/‘extremist’ parties. In the latter, Belgium provides an anomaly in terms of 
immigration’s level of contestation. While a majority of the countries covered in this 
issue exhibit some degree of polarisation between parties that want to pursue a more 
liberal vs. a more restrictive approach, the Belgian parties have tended to find 
consensus around a ‘doctrine of zero-immigration’ (Martiniello, 2003:225) where the 
main emphasis has been to reduce, prevent and reverse migration flows as much as 
possible. Greece, on the other hand, provides an extreme example of the state of ‘flux’ 
(Mair, 1989) that West European party systems are in politically as well 
economically. 
In order to test the relevance of the special issue’s thesis regarding ‘conflicting 
ideological pulls’, the case selection includes countries with varying degrees of public 
opposition to immigration, ranging from Greece (strongest) through the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Spain, Germany, Italy and (lowest) Sweden (Sides and Citrin, 2007). We 
have also included countries where the populist radical right has a parliamentary 
presence (Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Italy) and where it does not 
(Germany and Spain). The countries will thus shed light on the extent to which 
immigration, as a party-politically relevant issue, is dependent on, or largely 
independent of, these externalities. While we anticipate that the above conditions will 
have some effect on immigration’s level of politicisation, our main emphasis is placed 
on parties’ abilities to handle and negotiate these ideological ‘pulls’ and issue 
priorities. As such, we argue that it is the dynamics of party competition that is the 
key explanatory factor for when and why immigration becomes an electoral issue.  
Accordingly, we ask contributors to focus on both the centre-right and the centre-left. 
Despite the common wisdom that preferences can be read along a left (pro) – right 
(anti) continuum, the extent to which immigration policies became more or less 
restrictive, or integration policies more or less demanding, does not always map onto 
parties’ ideological affiliations. That is, the centre-left is just as likely as the centre-
right to introduce changes regarding immigration controls, citizenship policies or 
access to welfare benefits (Hinnfors et al, 2011).  
 
Finally, when analysing their respective cases, we ask our contributors to address the 
following questions.  
 
1) How divided are parties over the direction of immigration and/or integration 
policies?  
2) Are some parties more trusted than others on the immigration ‘issue’? If so, 
how have these differences played out in party competition? 
3) Has the immigration ‘issue’ brought the ideological tensions to the fore?  If so, 
how have the mainstream parties handled these strains? 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
What, then, do our cases, beginning with Germany, tell us?  For the German parties, 
agreeing on the general direction of policy has seen an increased emphasis on 
competence yet this has often been reluctantly, rather than enthusiastically, pursued. 
As Schmidtke’s contribution suggests, this hesitation is linked to multiple 
uncertainties: first, there is concern that competition over ownership may result in an 
unwelcome opening for the populist radical right; second, centre-left and centre-right 
parties have struggled to agree on what type of issue the immigration ‘issue’ 
constituted in the first place; and thirdly, there is doubt and debate within parties as to 
which segment of voters to pursue – in the case of the centre-left, for instance, should 
it be the ‘new’ ethnic or the ‘old’ working-class vote? The centre-right has perhaps 
fared better by merging the immigration ‘issue’ with policy areas associated with high 
levels of public trust.   
 The conflicting ideological ‘pulls’ have also been present in the Swedish case.  
But, as Widfeldt points out, these tensions have rarely translated into any overt 
electoral conflict but have instead remained under the surface. The centre-left, at least 
as a bloc, has been more prone to such strains given the clear tension on labour and 
asylum migration between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ left parties, whereas the centre-right 
has managed to steer the political conversation towards labour migration thereby 
avoiding any potential disunity arising from the more ideologically ambiguous 
refugee category. 
 In the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Flanders as well, all bets appear to 
be off. Super notes that, regardless of whether issue positions converge or diverge, or 
the extent of ‘pull’ that parties experience, the mainstream has increasingly opted for 
an ownership approach. Yet this has also been coupled with a more cautious 
‘Goldilocks’ tactic that attempts to straddle the ‘liberal’/’restrictionist’ divide without 
drawing too much attention to precise policy positions.  
The Mediterranean cases provide an illuminating contrast but also a number of 
similarities. Karamanidou, for example, highlights how ideological strains, and the 
overall directional consensus, have indeed come to affect the  strategies of the Greek 
mainstream and how these factors have quite clearly pushed parties towards an 
ownership-style mode of competition. At the same time, however, the sudden rise of 
Golden Dawn has accentuated these efforts rather than prompted parties to respond 
with a dismissive approach or to divert attention elsewhere. And in Spain, Morales et 
al find that mainstream parties converging around largely restrictive positions has not 
necessarily translated into more claims of issue ownership on their part. Rather 
counterintuitively in fact, the attention paid to, and the degrees of ownership 
competition over, the immigration ‘issue’ appears to be out of sync: parties that 
exhibit relatively low levels of trust on immigration emphasise it just as much as 
parties that enjoy higher levels of trust. The Spanish case also suggests a greater role 
for ideology in the political discourse around immigration but, somewhat surprising 
perhaps, fewer internal strains than are evident in other countries. Parties instead tend 
to stick to their long-standing positions despite political conditions which might have 
been expected to prompt positional, tactical and saliency shifts. This is possibly 
because of the novelty that the immigration ‘issue’ presents and how the Spanish 
parties have yet to agree on an appropriate frame and problem formulation of the 
‘issue’. This leaves the rather paradoxical case of Italy. Massetti finds that intra-party 
and inter-coalition dynamics have effectively trumped any hesitation that an 
ostensibly conservative party like Forza Italia might have been expected to display 
when dealing with a radical right coalition partner like the Lega Nord. And, whereas 
the centre-left in other countries often struggles to accommodate labour market 
protectionism with a focus on international solidarity, the Italian equivalent has been 
remarkably unaffected by this particular conflict due to the two-tier structure of the 
labour market. All this has come to neutralise any destabilising tension between 
different party wings and factions.  
Where, then, does this leave party competition on one of the most 
ideologically loaded policy areas in Western Europe? The overall picture suggests 
that parties are cautious creatures who tend to stick with ownership rather than 
striking out and offering choices, regardless of whether those choices involve 
liberalising or restricting entry regulations or involve pushing for more or less 
demanding modes of integration. One explanation for their seemingly natural caution 
(some might call it inertia) is that the choices they might consider may very well see 
them straying into or even stranded on the territory of their more radical competitors, 
be they radical right-wing populists or left-liberals or invite criticism for not being 
feasible.  
So how do our hypotheses stand up in the light of the contributions to this 
special issue? First, the immigration ‘issue’ does indeed appear to give rise to a 
directional consensus and, as such, is better placed in the realm of valance rather than 
positional competition (H1). Yet what the contributions also highlight is that parties 
often disagree about what type of ‘issue’ immigration constitutes, particularly if there 
is an internal party struggle over dimensional fit and societal impact. And while, 
secondly, it does indeed seem as if trust and competence are important for whether or 
not parties choose to campaign on immigration (H2) -related questions, a more 
pertinent query is, perhaps, the extent to which parties are able to merge their stances 
on immigration with issues where they enjoy higher competence ratings (H2). 
Thirdly, the immigration ‘issue’ has also more obviously crystallised internal 
ideological tensions the further North one looks, whereas in the South a much more 
complex relationship between ideology, the inter-party dynamics and immigration 
emerges (H3). 
Overall, then, we find stronger evidence for the first and second than for the 
last of our three hypotheses. This is in itself interesting. It raises a number of 
questions about the state of flux that party systems are said to be in but also about the 
shift that is taking place in the role of political parties. More ideological tension 
would suggest that ideas and visions continue to be important in contemporary 
European politics but the turn – or perhaps reversion - towards ownership competition 
is not so much a sign of ideology’s death as an indication of its continued importance. 
Since a majority of the parties covered here have struggled to accommodate their 
‘issue’ position with their ‘ideological’ orientation, the shift towards emphasising and 
evidencing competence is a convenient (and safe) way to bypass these ideological 
tensions. Our case selection, and the subsequent findings do, in a sense, suggest that 
something more is going on here than merely the demise of ideology and parties 
responding (either pro- or reactively) to various external ‘shocks’. The processes 
internal to parties themselves appear to be just as important for understanding why 
the political mainstream tends to not make a big deal out of the immigration ‘issue’. 
The analytical framework we propose and the questions we ask thus invite further 
comparisons to be made. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
Research support under the Economic and Social Research Council’s First Grant Scheme 
(RES-061-25–0195) is gratefully acknowledged. The guest editors would also like to 
thank the article referees, and the anonymous reviewer of the special issue for 
additional comments and suggestions.  
 
 
 
 
Bibliography  
Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L. and Glasgow, G. (2004) ‘Understanding change and 
stability in party ideologies: do parties respond to public opinion or to past election 
results?’, British Journal of Political Science 34(4): 589-610  
Alonso, S, and Fonseca, S. (2012). ‘Immigration, left and right’, Party Politics 18(6), pp. 
865-884. 
Bale, T. (2008) ‘Turning around the telescope: centre-right parties and immigration and 
integration policy in Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 15(3), pp. 315-331.  
Bale, T., ed. (2008) Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe: Why Politics - and the 
Centre-Right – Matter, Abingdon: Routledge (also published as a special issue of the 
Journal of European Public Policy, 15(3) 2008). 
Bale, T. (2010) The Conservative Party. From Thatcher to Cameron (Cambridge: Polity 
Press). 
Bale, T. (2013) ‘More and more restrictive—but not always populist: explaining variation 
in the British Conservative Party's stance on immigration and asylum’, Journal of 
Contemporary European Studies, 21(1), pp. 25-37. 
Bale, T., Green-Pedersen, C., Krouwel, A., Sitter, N. and Luther, R, (2010) 'If you can't 
beat them, join them? Explaining social democratic responses to the challenge from the 
populist radical right in Western Europe', Political Studies, 58(3), pp. 410-426. 
Bale, T. Hough, D and van Kessel, S. (2012) ‘In or out of proportion? Labour and social 
democratic parties’ responses to the radical right’ in J. Rydgren (2012) Class Politics and 
the Radical Right, Abingdon: Routledge. 
Bauböck, R., Ersböll, E., Groendijk, K. and Walrauch, H. (eds.) (2006) Acquisition and 
Loss of Nationality, Volume 2: Country Analyses (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press).  
Belanger, E. and Meguid, B.M. (2008) ‘Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based 
vote choice’, Electoral Studies 27(3), pp.477-491.  
Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2007) ’Estimating party policy positions: Comparing expert 
surveys and hand-coded content analysis’, Electoral Studies 26(1) pp. 90–107. 
Betz, H-G, (1994) Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press.  
Boswell, C. (2003) European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion 
and Exclusion, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Boswell, C. (2006) ‘Migration in Europe’ in Marshall, B. (ed.) The Politics of Migration: 
A Survey (London: Routledge).  
Budge, I. (1994) ‘A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and 
Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally’, British Journal of Political 
Science 24(4): pp. 443–467.  
Breunig, C. and Luedtke, A. (2008) ‘What Motivates the Gatekeepers? Explaining 
Governing Party Preferences on Immigration’ Governance: An International Journal of 
Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 21(1), pp. 123–146. 
Carvalho, J. (2014) Impact of Extreme Right Parties on Immigration Policy: Comparing 
Britain, France and Italy, Abingdon: Routledge. 
Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. (2003) The Age of Migration, Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
Cornelius, W., Martin, P.L. and Hollifield, J. F. (ed) (1994) Controlling Immigration: A 
Global Perspective, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Downs, A, (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper. 
Evans, G., Heath, A. and Lalljee, M., (1996) ‘Measuring Left-Right and Libertarian-
Authoritarian Values in the British Electorat’, The British Journal of Sociology, 47(1), pp. 
93-112. 
Ford, R., Jennings, W. and Somerville, W. (2014) ‘Public opinion, responsiveness and 
constraint: Britain's three immigration policy regimes’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 
Givens, T. and Luedtke, A. (2004) ‘The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: 
Institutions, Salience and Harmonization’, Policy Studies Journal 32(1), pp. 145-65.  
Green, J. (2007) ‘When voters and parties agree: valence issues and party 
competition’,Political Studies 55(3): pp. 629-655.  
Green, J. and Hobolt, S.B. (2008) ‘Owning the issue agenda: party strategies and vote 
choices in British elections’, Electoral Studies 27(3), pp. 460-476.  
Green-Pedersen, C. and Krogstrup, J. (2008) ‘Immigration as a political issue in Denmark 
and Sweden’, European Journal of Political Research 47(5), pp. 610–634. 
Hammar, T. (2006) ‘European immigration policy: a comparative study’ in Messina, 
A.M. and Lahav, G. (eds.) The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies, 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner.  
Hinnfors, J., Spehar, A. and Bucken-Knapp, G. (2011), ‘The Missing Factor: Why Social 
Democracy Can Lead to Restrictive Immigration Policy’, Journal of European Public 
Policy 19(4): 1-19. 
Hobolt, S., Klemmensen, R. and Pickup, M. (2008) The Dynamics of Issue Diversity in 
Party Rhetoric, OCSID Working Paper OCSID_03, http://ocsid.politics.ox.ac.uk/ 
publications/index.asp, accessed 15 June 2011.` 
Hooghe, L., Marks, G. and Wilson, C.J., (2002) ‘Does Left/Right structure party positions 
on European integration?’, Comparative Political Studies 35(8), 965-989.  
Inglehart, R. (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and 
Political Change in 43 Societies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Ireland, P. (2004) Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State,  
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.  
Jahn, D. (1993) ‘The rise and decline of new politics and the Greens in Sweden and 
Germany’, European Journal of Political Research 24(2), 177-194. 
Joppke, C. (1999) Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and 
Great Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Kitschelt, H. and McGann, A.J., (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe. A 
Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Klingemann, H- D, Volkens, A., Bara, J., Budge, I. and Macdonald, M. (2006) Mapping 
Policy Preference II: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments in Eastern 
Europe, the European Union and the OECD, 1990-2000, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (2000) ‘Migration and ethnic relations as a field of 
political contention: an opportunity structure approach’ in Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. 
(eds.) Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics: Comparative European 
Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13-56.  
  
Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M. and Passy, Florence, (2005) Contested 
Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press.  
Kriesi, H, Grande, E, Lachat, R, Dolezal, M, Bornschier, S. and Frey, T. (2006) 
‘Globalisation and the transformation of the national political space: six European 
countries compared’, European Journal of Political Research 45(6), 921-956.  
Mair, P. (1989) ‘Continuity, change and the vulnerability of party’, West European 
Politics 12(4): 169-187/. 
Martiniello, M. (2003) ‘Belgium’s immigration policy’, International Migration Review 
37(1): 225-232.  
Meguid, B. (2005) “Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party 
Strategy in Niche Party Success”, American Political Science Review, 90(3), 347-359. 
Messina, A.M. (2007) The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western 
Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mudde, C., (2004) ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541-563.  
Müller-Rommel, F., (1989) New Politics in Western Europe. The Rise of Green Parties 
and Alternative Lists, Boulder: Westview Press. 
Norris, P. (1995) Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Odmalm, P. (2011) ‘Political Parties and ‘the Immigration Issue’: Issue ownership in 
Swedish Parliamentary Elections 1991-2010’, West European Politics 34(5): 1070-1091. 
Odmalm, P. (2012) ‘Party competition and positions on immigration: strategic advantages 
and spatial locations’, Comparative European Politics 10(1): 1-22. 
Odmalm, P. (2014) The Party Politics of the EU and Immigration (Basingstoke: Palgrave).  
Pellikaan, H., de Lange, Sarah L. and van der Meer, T., (2007) ‘Fortuyn’s legacy: party 
system change in the Netherlands’, Comparative European Politics 5(3), 282-302. 
Perlmutter, T., (1996) "Bringing Parties Back In: Comments on ‘Modes of immigration 
politics in liberal democratic societies’," International Migration Review, 30(1), 375-88. 
Petrocik, J., (1996) ‘Issue ownership in presidential elections with a 1980 case study’, 
American Journal of Political Science 40(3): 825-850.  
Rabinowitz, Gary and MacDonald, Stuart (1989) ‘A Directional Theory of Issue Voting’, 
The American Political Science Review, 83(1): pp. 93-121. 
Rydgren, J. (2005) ‘Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the 
emergence of a new party families’, European Journal of Political Research 44(3): 413-
437.  
Riker, W. (1996) The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution, 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Schain, M. (2008) The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain and the United States: 
A Comparative Study, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Schattschneider, E. (1960) The Semi-sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in 
America,   New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Sides, J. and Citrin, J. (2007) ‘European opinion about immigration: the role of identities, 
interests and information’, British Journal of Political Science 37: 477-504.   
Spehar, A., Bucken-Knapp, G.. and Hinnfors, J. (2013) ‘Ideology and entry policy: why 
center-right parties in Sweden support open-door migration policies’ in U. Korkut G. 
Bucken-Knapp, A. McGarry, J.Hinnfors, H. Drake (eds.) The Discourses and Politics of 
Migration in Europe, New York: Palgrave, pp. 171-190.. 
Stokes, D.E., (1963) ‘Spatial models of party competition’, American Political Science 
Review 57(2), 368–377. 
Thränhardt, D. (1995) ‘The political uses of xenophobia in England, France and 
Germany’, Party Politics 1(3), 323-345.  
van der. Brug, W. (2004) ‘Issue ownership and party choice’, Electoral Studies 23(2), 
209-233.   
van der Brug W. and van Spanje, J. (2009) ‘Immigration, Europe and the ‘new’ cultural 
dimension’, European Journal of Political Research 48(3), pp. 309-334.  
Van Spanje, J. (2010) ‘Contagious Parties: Anti-Immigration Parties and Their Impact on 
Other Parties’ Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe’, Party Politics 
16(5): 563-586. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
